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INSURANCE LAW – POLICY STACKING 
 
 Appeal from a district court order granting summary judgment in a contract action.   
Summary 
 
 Reversed the order of the district court, concluding that a passenger injured by 
concurrently negligent drivers may recover from both the permissive driver’s insurance policy 
liability benefits based on the permissive driver’s negligence and underinsured motorist benefits 
based on the other driver’s underinsured status.   
Disposition/Outcome 
 
 In December 2004, Dionicia Delgado was injured in an automobile accident while riding 
as a passenger in a car owned and operated by Eunice Marcelino.  Another car, owned and 
operated by Toquanda Dean, struck Marcelino’s car, severely injuring Dionicia.  Marcelino was 
insured by American Family Insurance Group (hereafter “AF”) for liability up to $50,000 per 
person and had underinsured motorist coverage up to $25,000 per person.  Dean carried an 
insurance policy with a $15,000 liability limitation.   
Factual and Procedural History 
 
 Marcelino’s underinsured motorist policy promises that AF will “pay compensatory 
damages for bodily injury which an insured person is legally entitled to recover from the owner 
or operator of an underinsured motor vehicle.” An “[i]nsured person” is defined as the 
contracting party, relatives, and “[a]nyone else occupying [Marcelino’s] . . . insured car.”  The 
parties do not dispute that Dionicia was an “[i]nsured person” under Marcelino’s underinsured 
motorist provision. 
 
 AF’s policy defined an “[u]nderinsured motor vehicle” as “a motor vehicle which is 
insured by a liability bond or policy at the time of the accident and the amount of the bond or 
policy . . . [i]s less than the limit of underinsured motorists coverage under this policy.”  
Although Marcelino’s policy excludes Marcelino’s vehicle from underinsured/uninsured 
coverage, another driver’s vehicle qualifies as underinsured if the other driver’s policy carried 
less liability coverage than the limit of Marcelino’s under/uninsured coverage.   
  
 Delgado offered to settle with AF for $75,000--$50,000 for liability plus $25,000 for 
underinsured coverage.  Dionicia also offered to settle with Dean’s carrier for the extent of 
Dean’s $15,000 liability policy.  AF denied Dionicia’s underinsured motorist claim.   
Dionicia and her husband filed suit, complaining that by denying Dionicia’s demand for 
payment of Marcelino’s underinsured coverage, AF breached its contractual obligations.  The 
Delgados grounded their breach of contract claim on the factual assertion that Marcelino’s 
vehicle qualified as the underinsured vehicle.                                                           
1 By Thomas D. Pilkington 
AF moved for summary judgment, arguing that the Delgados could not recover under the 
assertion that Marcelino’s car was the underinsured vehicle because Marcelino’s policy excluded 
Marcelino’s car from qualifying as underinsured.  In support, AF cited to Nevada Supreme Court 
decisions Peterson,2 and Baker,3
In opposition, the Delgados argued that the policy only excluded vehicles covered under 
Marcelino’s policy, and the Delgados alleged that their underinsured motorist claim was based 
on the Dean vehicle being underinsured.  Further, the Delgados distinguished their case from 
Peterson and Baker by arguing that, unlike in those cases, where claimants sought to recover 
under the permissive driver’s negligence alone, here, the Delgados’ claim sought to recover 
based on Dean’s joint negligence and the Dean vehicle being underinsured.   
 where the court precluded recovery under both liability and 
underinsured motorist coverage provisions of a single insurance policy.   
The district court concluded that Marcelino’s vehicle was not “underinsured” as defined 
by the policy and that Peterson and Baker barred recovery for both liability and underinsured 
benefits, and consequently granted AF’s motion for summary judgment.  This appeal followed. 
Initially, AF contended that the Delgados’ claim was barred by judicial estoppel because 
the Delgados named the wrong motorist in the complaint.  The court disagreed since the 
Delgados argued the correct underinsured party in their opposition to AF’s motion for summary 
judgment, without objection by AF.   
Discussion 
 
In resolving the appeal, the court addressed an issue of first impression: whether, in light 
of Peterson and Baker, a passenger injured in a two-car collision where both drivers are 
concurrently negligent may recover liability benefits under the permissive driver’s policy based 
on the permissive driver’s negligence, and also recover underinsured motorist benefits under the 
same policy for the negligence of the other driver, whose vehicle was underinsured. 
 
A. 
1. Peterson 
Peterson and Baker are not controlling in this case 
 In Peterson, the court addressed whether a passenger “is entitled to recover benefits 
under both the ‘bodily injury’ and the uninsured/underinsured motorist coverages afforded by a 
single insurance policy.”4  Because Peterson sought recovery based only on the permissive 
driver’s negligence, but under both coverages in the single insurance policy, the court concluded 
that Peterson was essentially attempting to increase the liability coverage under the owner’s 
policy, and the stacking of both policies was impermissible.5
 
 
2. 
 In Baker, the passenger sought to recover liability and uninsured/underinsured motorist 
benefits under her own policy of insurance, and not the permissive driver’s.
Baker 
6
                                                        
2 Peterson v. Colonial Ins. Co., 100 Nev. 474, 686 P.2d 239 (1984). 
  The court 
determined that once a passenger has recovered under the vehicle owner’s liability policy—
3 Baker v. Criterion Ins., 107 Nev. 25, 805 P.2d 599 (1991). 
4Peterson, 100 Nev. at 475, 686 P.2d at 239. 
5 Id. at 476, 686 P.2d at 240. 
6 Baker, 107 Nev. at 26, 805 P.2d at 599-600. 
whether that policy is the permissive driver’s policy or the passenger’s own policy—the 
passenger may not also recover under the owner’s uninsured/underinsured motorist policy.7
 
 
3. 
 The Delgados argued that their case was factually distinguishable from the Peterson and 
Baker cases, which involved single automobiles and the vehicles’ respective insurance policies, 
whereas their case involves the concurrent negligence of two drivers, with separate insurance 
policies, both of which were insufficient according to Dionicia.   
District court erred when it relied on Peterson and Baker 
  
 In Peterson and Baker, the court relied upon a Nevada statute requiring underinsured 
vehicle coverage to enable “the insured to recover up to the limits of his own coverage any 
amount of damages for bodily injury from his insurer which he is legally entitled to recover from 
the owner or operator of the other vehicle.” 8  The Peterson  and  Baker courts reasoned that 
allowing a passenger to recover under the permissive driver’s liability and underinsured policy 
based solely on the permissive driver’s negligence would impermissibly increase the liability 
limit for the owner/insured.9
 
  
 Neither Peterson nor Baker precludes recovery of underinsured benefits under the facts 
presented in this case.  In Peterson and Baker, both claims were based on the negligence of the 
permissive driver, not a third-party tortfeasor.  Contrary to the facts in Peterson and Baker, here, 
Dionicia made her claim based on Dean’s concurrent negligence and the Dean vehicle being 
underinsured.  The Delgados did not assert that Marcelino’s vehicle qualified as an underinsured 
vehicle.  This distinction is important because the stacking prohibition set forth in Peterson and 
Baker is not implicated in this situation.   
 
4. 
 The court stated in St. Paul Fire that the purpose of uninsured/underinsured motorist 
coverage is to compensate the insured for damages “based upon the tort liability of the 
uninsured, underinsured, or hit-and-run driver.”
Allowing recovery of underinsured benefits under the facts presented in this 
case coheres with the purpose of the uninsured/underinsured motorist 
coverage 
10
 
  Allowing a passenger to recover both liability 
and underinsured motorist benefits under a single policy of insurance is consistent with the 
purpose of such coverage because the passenger is being compensated for damages caused by the 
joint negligence of an uninsured/underinsured driver.   
 The court pointed to several secondary sources to support the proposition that a passenger 
that is insured by the permissive driver’s insurance policy may also recover under the 
underinsured motorist provision when a second negligent vehicle involved in the accident was 
underinsured.11                                                        
7 Id. at 26, 805 P.2d at 600. 
  
8 NEV. REV. STAT. § 687B.145(2) (2007); Peterson, 100 Nev. at 475, 686 P.2d at 240; Baker, 107 Nev. at 27, 805 
P.2d at 600. 
9 Peterson, 100 Nev. at 476, 686 P.2d at 240; Baker, 107 Nev. at 27, 805 P.2d at 600. 
10 St. Paul Fire v. Employers Ins. Co. of Nev., 122 Nev. 991, 993, 146 P.3d 258, 260 (2006). 
11 3 IRVIN E. SCHERMER & WILLIAM J. SCHERMER, AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY INSURANCE § 39:12 (4th ed. 2004); 1 
ALAN I. WIDISS & JEFFREY E. THOMAS, UNINSURED AND UNDERINSURED MOTORIST INSURANCE § 14.6 (3d ed. 
2005). 
 
 Other jurisdictions have also determined that a guest passenger may recover for another 
driver’s negligence under his or the permissive driver’s uninsured or underinsured motorist 
policy and recover for the permissive driver’s negligence as a third party claimaint.12   The court 
in Dairyland reasoned that when the permissive driver’s negligence—i.e. when the permissive 
driver’s policy excludes the permissive driver’s vehicle from being deemed underinsured—a 
passenger could recover underinsured motorist benefits for injuries caused by a jointly negligent 
and underinsured motorist involved in the accident when the permissive driver’s policy language 
extended coverage to that passenger.13
  
 
 Similarly, other courts have reasoned that prohibition against stacking policies is not 
implicated when the passenger’s injuries are attributable to joint tortfeasors because it is the 
other driver’s concurrent negligence and uninsured status that triggers the passenger’s claim for 
underinsured benefits from his driver’s insurer.14
 
 
 Here, under Marcelino’s policy, Delgado was a lawful occupant of Marcelino’s vehicle; 
therefore, the policy extended underinsured motorist coverage to Delgado at the time of the 
accident.  Although Marcelino’s vehicle could not qualify as an underinsured vehicle under the 
terms of the policy, the Dean vehicle could.  Based on the aforementioned rationale, the court 
concluded that if Marcelino and Dean are adjudged jointly negligent, the Delgados can recover 
under Marcelino’s underinsured motorist policy for Dean’s negligence and the Dean vehicle’s 
underinsured status.  Therefore, AF was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 The court reached several conclusions.  First, judicial estoppel did not preclude the 
Delgados from raising the argument that their claim was based on the concurrent negligence of 
both drivers involved in the accident.  Second, because the Delgado case is factually 
distinguishable from Peterson and Baker, the stacking prohibition set forth in those cases is 
inapplicable to the facts presented in the Delgado case.  Third, accordingly, Dionicia was entitled 
to recover under both the liability and underinsured motorist provisions of Marcelino’s policy 
with AF.   Lastly, because AF was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law, the court reversed 
and remanded the order of the district court. 
                                                        
12 See, e.g., Dairyland Ins. Co. v. Bradley, 451 S.E.2d 765 (W. Va. 1994). 
13 Id. at 767-68. 
14 See, e.g., Woodard v. Pa. Nat. Mut. Ins. Co., 534 So. 2d 716, 721 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988); Lahr v. Am. Family 
Mut. Ins. Co., 528 N.W.2d 257, 260 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995). 
